Warrant canary

Signed monthly statement. If this page stops updating or the signature stops verifying, assume we've been served with compelled legal process we can't disclose.

🐦 As of 2026-04-17, Zoza Vault has NOT received:

Statement date: 2026-04-17 · Next update: 2026-05-17

Any National Security Letter (US) or equivalent foreign gag-order demand.
Any FISA order or FISA directive under 50 U.S.C. §1801 et seq.
Any Section 702 directive.
Any demand to insert a backdoor, weaken encryption, or hand over private keys.
Any India MeitY blocking order or decryption-assistance demand under IT Act §69.
Any EU electronic-evidence preservation order under e-Evidence Regulation.
Any demand for access to customer plaintext (we cannot provide it regardless — the server never sees it).

⚠ How to read this canary

If the date above is more than 35 days old, or if the signature below fails to verify, consider this canary dead. Canaries cannot legally mention what they've received — they can only stop. If a canary stops, switch to the assumption that a demand has arrived.

Signed statement

This canary is signed with the same Ed25519 key that signs our public audit log. The fingerprint is pinned at the top of /about/vault-audit and in products/zoza-vault/OPS.md.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256

As of 2026-04-17, Zoza Vault (zoza.world/about/vault) has not received
any national security letter, FISA order, gag order, backdoor demand,
key-escrow demand, or decryption-assistance demand from any government,
regulatory body, or private party.

This statement is renewed on the 17th of each month.

Public key fingerprint (Ed25519, base64):
  (will be populated on first signing)

Statement date: 2026-04-17
Next statement: 2026-05-17

Verification: paste this entire block into any PGP-compatible verifier
together with the signature below. The public key is fetched from
https://vault-api.zoza.world/v1/canary/pubkey.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----

(signature will be populated on first signing; until then, consider
this canary unsigned and the protection deferred. The canary page is
in place so the signing mechanism is reviewable publicly. Signing
begins when the first customer deploys.)

-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

How the canary works

Monthly update. On the 17th of each month, a Zoza maintainer signs a fresh statement with the canary's Ed25519 key and commits the update to this file.
Verifiable in your browser. The signature and public key are both on this page. No network call required — copy the block, verify with any PGP / Ed25519 tool.
The key is split. We're moving to a split-key Shamir setup where the canary signing requires cooperation from three separate key-holders. If one is coerced, they can't sign alone. Today the key is single-party; split planned by v0.2.
The canary cannot self-extinguish under legal compulsion. US courts have consistently held that compelled speech (signing a new canary that lies) is distinct from compelled silence (not renewing). We'll never sign a canary we know to be false.

What this canary is not

A canary is a negative signal — it proves absence, not compliance. It does NOT mean:

That Zoza's systems are bug-free. We run a bug bounty for that; see /about/vault-bounty.
That Zoza has never been audited by a government. Regular audits happen; the canary is about compelled-secret process, not voluntary cooperation with published law.
That Zoza will always operate. If Zoza ceases operating, the canary ceases too; absence of a new signed statement could mean shutdown as easily as a warrant.

Warrant canary

Signed statement

How the canary works

What this canary is not

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